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EscHEAT - ABANDONED PROPERTY - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
AS A BAR TO MULTIPLE EscHEAT OF !NTANGIBLES-Escheat of
abandoned or unclaimed property by the sovereign is as old as the
common law.1 Recast in constitutional form, this ancient right
of kings has become a significant source of revenue in an increasing number of American states.2 While the right of escheat is
inherent in the power of a sovereign, its exercise requires specific
legislative authority. Until recently this authority was sparingly
given and escheat was generally limited to the administration of
estates3 and abandoned tangible property. 4 However, in this past
decade, state legislatures have greatly expanded the scope and
extent of escheat by authorizing the escheat of abandoned intangiblel$ property. 6 Spurred by the urgent demands of public
finance and the successes of other states, few legislatures will be
able to resist for long this scent of unclaimed millions in non-tax
revenue.7
Unfortunately, the escheat of intangible property raises serious
problems not presented when tangible property is involved. The
major problem is that of multiple escheat - the possibility that a
17 HOLDSWORTH, A H1srORY OF ENGLISH LAw 495-96 (2d ed. 1937); IO id. at 350 (1938).
2 McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer, 14
Bus. LAw. 1062 (1959).
3 Two related issues are presented here: devolution of property to the state on failure
of heirs or other takers, e.g., Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915) (land);
Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911) (personalty); Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896)
(land), and power of the state to administer the estates of missing persons, e.g., Cunnius
v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1904).
4 McBride, supra note 2, at 1063.
5 See Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw. 791, 793-94 (1960), for illustrations of the kinds of intangible property subject to escheat today. Examples include
stock, dividends, unredeemed cafeteria coupons, and bribe money offered a public official.
6 McBride, supra note 2, at 1063, and Ely, supra note 5, at 791-92, list the following
states as having statutes covering the escheat of intangible property: Arizona (1956), Alaska
(1921), Arkansas (1949), California (1959), Connecticut (1949), Kentucky (1940), Massa•
chusetts (1950), Montana (1895), Michigan (1947), New Jersey (1946), New Mexico (1959),
New York (1944), North Carolina (1947), Oregon (1957), Pennsylvania (1915), Utah (1957),
Virginia (1960), and Washington (1955).
7 "Corporate stocks and dividends represent a significant, if indeterminate, source of
potential revenue. A single illustration of such a source is found in one corporation
which holds $180,000 in unclaimed dividends and has $200,000 outstanding in uncashed
dividend checks. The value of the stock underlying these dividends must also be taken
into consideration." Quoted by McBride, supra note 2, at 1062, from a comment by an
cscheat subcommittee in its report to the California legislature prior to enactment of
California escheat legislation in 1959.
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holder8 of abandoned intangible property may be required by
successive escheat proceedings in different states to disgorge the
full value of the property to each. This problem arises primarily
because of present jurisdictional theory. Under present theories,
any state having sufficient "contact" with the transaction creating
the intangible, and thereby able to serve the holder ·with process,
is held to have jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat.9 Where
the holder is an interstate corporation it is clear that at least two
states could have jurisdiction: the state of incorporation,10 and the
state where the corporation conducts a significant amount of business relating to that intangible.11 In its decision in Standard Oil
Co. v. New Jersey, a majority of the Supreme Court stated that the
full faith and credit clause would prevent multiple escheat.12 It
is the purpose of this comment to examine and evaluate this theory
in the setting of escheat of intangible property.

I.

THE NATURE OF EscHEAT

The term "escheat" has many meanings today. Historically,
"escheat" was a doctrine of succession to real property upon failure
of descent. When a tenant in fee simple died without heirs or
committed a felony his land reverted to the crown or mesne lord
by "escheat."13 In this sense, "escheat" depended upon feudal
systems of tenure. Since "escheat" applied only to real property,
and since feudal systems of tenure are not generally utilized in
this country, the term is now rarely used in this historical sense.
Rather, the term is commonly used today without reference to the
8 In this comment, the term "holder" will be used to mean any person or corporation
in possession of property belonging to another, no matter how the obligation or possession
arose. Examples include trustee in case of a trust, debtor in case of debt, and corporation in
case of stock. This convenient terminology corresponds to that utilized in the Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act § I. The term "owner" is similarly defined for
the purposes of this comment to mean, e.g., beneficiary in case of trust or creditor in case
of debt. "Owner" and "holder" therefore refer to the parties between which an obligation
- the "intangible property" - exists.
o Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
l0Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
11 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). See dissent of Justices Douglas and Black in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, supra note 10, at 445, for
additional possibilities.
12 "The debts or demands represented by the stock and dividends having been taken
from the appellant company by a valid judgment of New Jersey, the same debts or
demands against appellant cannot be taken by another state. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause bars any such double escheat." Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U. s. 428, 443
(1951).
1s See 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 67-72 (3d ed. 1923); 10 id. at 350
(1938).
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particular theory underlying the action to indicate the action of a
state in transferring title or possession of property to itself. For
convenience and simplicity the term "escheat" will be used in this
generic sense - indicating only the action of a state in transferring
title or possession to abandoned property to itself.
It is often suggested14 that the power to escheat abandoned
property is derived from the ancient doctrines of bona vacantia.1 r,
At common law, abandoned personal property, tangible or intangible,16 could be transferred to the crmvn by virtue of the king's
prerogative. Certain classes of abandoned property were designated bona vacantia and thereby taken out of the operation of
common law rules relating to "finders";17 the classes of abandoned
property so designated included "treasure trove," "·wreck," "waif,"
"estrays," and the property of an intestate without next of kin.18
Bona vacantia was therefore simply an exception to the rules of
title by occupation. The rationale underlying bona vacantia was
stated by Blackstone to be the prevention of "that strife and contention, which the mere title of occupancy is apt to create and
continue, and to provide for the support of public authority in a
manner the least burdensome to individuals. . . ." 19 Title to the
property went to the king, not as ultimus heres, but by the jus
regalia - that is, the king did not take as "last heir," or by "paramount title," as in the case of escheat in its historical sense, but
through the exercise of his prerogative.20 The extent to which the
common law of bona vacantia is applicable to this country depends
upon whether the king's prerogative rights have been assimilated
as a part of the sovereign powers of the state. Since it would seem
that the rationale underlying bona vacantia is well adapted to
assimilation as one of the "police powers" of a sovereign state, this
ancient doctrine should provide more than ample authority for
modern escheat if historical justification is required. 21
14 E.g., Anderson Nat'! Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Ely, Pennsylvania Esclieat
Laws: Proposals for Revision, 64 DICK. L. REv. 329, 331-33 (1960); McBride, supra note 2,
at 1063; Garrison, Esclieats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 KY.

L.J. 302, 302-04 (1947).
15 "Vacant, unclaimed, or stray goods." BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 223 (4th ed. 1951).
16 "[A]ny personal property whether chattels personal or chattels real and whether
choses in possession or choses in action may be the subject matter of bona vacantia."
ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA 13 (1927). Contra, Ely, supra note 14, at 331-33.
17 7 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 495-96 (2d ed. 1937); see generally,
ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA (1927).
1810 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 350 (1938); ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA
65-74 (1927).
19 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •299.
20 ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA 45 (1927).
21 Garrison, supra note 14, at 304; cf. Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458,
469 (1905).
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Whatever its origin or rationale, the power to escheat abandoned property is unquestioned.22 Two general classes of statutes
providing for the transfer of title or possession to abandoned
property have been enacted in this country. In one class, title to
the property is transferred to the state; 23 in the other, only possession is transferred.24 When it is found desirable to differentiate
the two, the first is usually called an "escheat" statute; the second,
a "custodial"25 one. In both classes, the passage of time without
action of some sort by the owner raises a presumption that the
property is "abandoned," 26 thereby bringing the property within
the provisions of the statute. Minimal provisions for notice to the
owner are usually incorporated in the statutes.27 Within a specified
period, title or possession to the property is transferred to the state
by administrative or judicial proceedings and the property is sold
at public auction.28 In the custodial statute, the owner is allowed
to reclaim the proceeds of this sale by submitting proper proof of
ownership.29 In escheat statutes, the property is declared abandoned and all rights of the owner are terminated.30 However, it
is common for states with custodial statutes also to provide for
escheat by termination of the mvner's rights to reclaim after a
22 "'\Ve need not consider whether a state possesses inherent power for such legislation
as to personalty as the successor to a prerogative of royal sovereignty. As a broad principle
of jurisprudence rather than as a result of the evolution of legal rules, it is clear that a
state, subject to constitutional limitations, may use its legislative power to dispose of
property within its reach, belonging to unknown persons." Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 435-3,6 (1951).
23 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-ll to 2A:37-44 (1952); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 393.010.990 (1960).
24E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 567.1, .11-.76 (1948), §§ 567.201-.206 (Supp. 1956); N.Y.
AnAND. PRoP. LAw §§ 300-1406.
25 See McBride, supra note 2, at 1063-64, for a list of statutes classified in this manner.
20 Very often the period is seven years - the common-law period for presumption of
death. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 567.37 (1948); UNIFORM DISPOSmON OF UNCLAIMED
PROPERTY ACT § 2 (b). But the period may be more or less depending upon whether the
statute is of the escheat or custodial type. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-13 (1952) (14
years-escheat); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-29 (1952) (5 years-custody). This suggests
that the underlying rationale of escheat may be considered analogous to that of missing
persons, see, e.g., Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458, 469 (1905), and that
seven years' absence without tidings is the minimum period for this type of statute. But
presumption of death is not essential to custodial-type statutes, and if the state is protecting property as conservator for benefit of the owner, a lesser period of time may be
adequate.
27 Posting notice on courthouse door held adequate. Anderson Nat'! Bank v. Luckett,
321 U.S. 233 (1944); but cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). See also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 567.36 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-18 to
2A:37-19 (1952); N.Y. AnAND. PROP. LAw §§ 302, 402, 601, 702, 1002, 1402.
28E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 567.56-.61 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-21 (1952);
N.Y. AnAND. PROP. LAw § 1403.
20 MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 567.63-.65 (1948); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAw § 1406.
ao N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:37-25 (1952) makes title in purchaser at sale absolute and makes
no provision for suit by owner against state after 14-year escheat period and proceedings.
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specified period of custody.31 In these states there will be very
little practical difference between the two types as far as the owner's rights are concerned.
With respect to the problem of multiple escheat, the courts have
refused to distinguish between these two types of statutes.32 The
important theoretical difference between the two types is that
in a custodial statute, the owner's rights are not immediately
terminated. And in a pure custodial type, such as the Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, they are never terminated.
That act provides for perpetual custody and allows a claim by the
owner at any time.33 This distinction raises very different questions of due process between the ovmer and the state. In the
custodial statute there is no "taking"34 of property from the owner
- the state is merely acting as "conservator" of an absent mmer's
property.31' In an escheat statute there is a "taking," and it might
be expected that much more stringent requirements would be
placed upon the exercise of escheat in such cases.36 As far as the
state is concerned there should be little practical difference in the
end result under either type - the owner is not likely to return.
But it has been held that the distinction between the two types is
the concern of the owner and not the holder. 37 Both types of
statutes are treated in the same manner in the escheat proceeding
between the holder and the state. It is said that if the state is
entitled to payment, the holder's liability to the o,;mer is discharged
under either type of statute; therefore the holder's sole interest in
the controversy is jurisdictional.38 Since the courts have elected
31 It seems to be merely a matter of terminology whether statutes of this type should
be called custodial with later escheat or merely escheat types. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:37-ll to 2A:37-44 (1952) provides for escheat after 14 years but an alternative method
provides for "protective custody" after 5 years and escheat after 14 years. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:37-29 (1952). This illustrates the difficulty in classifying a statute as custodial or
escheat, as well as the great differences in statutes of various states. There is no "typical''
statute of either type.
82 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 437-38 (1951).
83 UNIFORM DzsposmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Ac::r § 19.
84 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I, provides in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of .•• property, without due process of law.•.." Cf. Cities Serv. Co. v. McGrath,
342 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1952).
85 Cf. Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 664 (1911); Anderson
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241-42 (1944).
86 Cf. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, supra note 35, at 241-42; Garrison, supra note
14, at 305, 310.
87 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 438-39 (1951), citing Security Sav.
Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923), and Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, supra note 35.
88 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 286 (1923): "It is no concern of the
bank's whether the State receives the money merely as depository or takes it as an escheat."
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1944): "Since the bank is a debtor
to its depositors, it can interpose no due process or contract clause objection to payment
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to treat the two types of statutes the same, as far as the holder is
concerned, the following discussion is facilitated by the use of the
term "escheat" to refer to the transfer of title or possession under
either type.

II.

THE JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR EscHEAT OF ABANDONED

INTANGIBLE PROPERTY

The common-law theory of jurisdiction is based upon "power"
in the physical sense of property or persons present within the
territorial limits of a state.39 This concept is reinforced and given
a distinctive effect in America through interpretation of our federal constitution. While at common law a judgment rendered
without physical power over the property or persons sought to be
bound was valid within the territorial limits of the state,40 under
our Constitution such a judgment is invalid as a denial of due process of law, even ·within the state rendering it.41 Analytically, it is
necessary to distinguish between this form of constitutional invalidity and another which arises from a failure to give adequate
notice to parties adversely affected by a judgment. The rendition
of a judgment without physical power over the property or persons to be bound is commonly termed a violation of "substantive"
due process,42 while a failure to give adequate notice is a violation
of "procedural" due process.43 As will be seen, a failure to distinguish these requirements has caused needless confusion in the
area of escheat.
Pennoyer v. Nef/4 4 is the leading American case exemplifying
the "power" theory of jurisdiction, and presents two propositions
of the claimed deposits to the state.••. But if the statute is deficient in its provisions for
notice and opportunity for hearing so that the depositors would not be bound by any
proceedings taken under it, the bank would be entitled to raise the question whether its
obligation to the depositors would be discharged by payment of the deposits to the state."
39 "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power•••." Mr. Justice Holmes in
McDonald v. Mabee 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). See generally GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws
§§ 67-79 (3d ed. 1949). But cf. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws pt. 1, § 25 at 78-80
(1959); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
40 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 39, § 72. The only inquiry was whether the legis•
lature had granted authority to the court.
41 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 39, § 76, at 186; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 60-62
(2d ed. 1951).
42 For an excellent discussion of the distinctions, and of the confusion engendered by
the failure of the courts to make them, see Perry, The Mullane Doctrine -A Reappraisal
of Statutory Notice Requirements, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 32, 39-43
(1952).
43 This is often discussed under the heading of "notice."
44 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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of importance to the area of escheat. First, a "seizure" of property
within the territorial boundaries of a state is essential to the
validity of an in rem judgment.45 Second, substituted service is
insufficient to support an in personam judgment against a nonresident.46 Traditional theories require the classification of a
judgment as in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam, according to the
purported effect of the judgment.47 The jurisdictional facts necessary to give a judgment this effect are similarly classified. An
escheat proceeding is usually thought of as operating in rem48
because it purports to affect interests in the property itself.40
Our traditional theories of jurisdiction therefore require the
"seizure" of something within the state.50 No difficulty is presented when only tangible property is sought to be escheated, for
its seizure is an incontrovertible physical fact. But when the
property escheated is intangible, any seizure is bound to be fictional.51 Conceptually, the seizure is a demonstration of power in
much the same way as is personal service of process in an in personam action. Seizure is also important in the sense that it shows
something to be present within the territorial limits of the state.
It is in this sense that the concept of situs for intangible property
is important, for only when property is located within the state
can power be demonstrated by seizure.52 To accommodate traditional theories, the courts have assigned a fictional situs to intangibles which varies according to the particular purpose to be
served. 53 It has been said that "at the root of the selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice
and convenience in particular conditions. . . ." 54 Although it is
difficult to generalize in the area of escheat, it may be stated as a
first approximation that the situs of the intangible is where the
45 See also GOODRICH, CONFLIGr OF LAws § 71, at 177 (3d ed. 1949).
See also EHRENZWEIG, CoNFLicr OF LAws pt. 1, § Zl (1959), and cases cited.
47 See REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to Chapter I (1942).
48Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 245 (1944); Security Sav. Bank v.
California, 263 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1923).
49 REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to Chapter I (1942).
50 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 439 (1951).
51 "It is true that fiction plays a part in the jurisprudential concept of control over
intangibles. There is no fiction, however, in the fact that choses in action, stock certificates
and dividends held by the corporation, are property." Ibid.
-02 Cf. Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation, 31 HARv. L. REv. 905, 906 (1918).
-03 Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123, 174 N.E.
299, 300 (1931) EHRENZWEIG, CONFLicr OF LAws pt. 1, § 26, at 84 (1959).
54 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., supra
note 53, at 123-24.
46
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holdei-0 5 can be served with process. In essence, what the courts
have done for the purpose of accommodating traditional jurisdictional theories is to treat an intangible as if it were a tangible - a
debt as if it were an automobile.
This present theory of jurisdiction is a modification and extension of ideas contained in Harris v. Balk.56 In that case it was held
that payment of a debt to a garnisher in Maryland was a defense
to a subsequent action by the creditor against the garnishee, and
that personal service upon the garnishee in Maryland was sufficient to support a quasi in rem judgment of garnishment there.57
Therefore full faith and credit required the North Carolina court
to allow the garnishee to plead his payment under the Maryland
judgment.58
Professor Beale has condemned this decision as "absolutely
opposed to the decisions of many of the best courts in this country. "50 The basis for his objection was that the Maryland court did
not have jurisdiction quasi in rem because it did not have "control" over both the debtor and the creditor.60 Logically following
the "power" theory of jurisdiction, he argued that jurisdiction
meant control, and since the debt had no physical existence and
subsisted only as a legal relationship between the debtor and the
creditor, control over the debt could be obtained only by control
over both the parties.61 In effect he argued that with respect to
intangible property, jurisdiction quasi in rem could not be
obtained without first obtaining in personam jurisdiction over
both the parties.
55 See note 8 supra for definition of "holder" and "owner" as used in this comment.
56198 U.S. 215 (1905).
57 The apparent theory of the court was that the garnisher was an agent of the
garnishee's creditor. This theory was originally suggested in Roon, GARNISHMENT § 246
(1896); it provides no answer to the jurisdictional question, for the agency must be by
operation of law, and the court's jurisdiction to appoint the garnisher is not apparent.
This fiction seems no more reasonable than that of merely assigning a situs for the purposes of jurisdiction.
liB A distinction must be made between allowing the garnishee to plead payment as a
defense and holding the debt "discharged." In the former case the obligation is not
terminated, but something like a set-off to the extent of payment to the garnisher exists.
"Discharge" in the sense of termination of the obligation can occur only where the court
has in personam jurisdiction over both the parties. While there may be little practical
difference between the two, there is, as will be seen, a great theoretical difference in the
area of escheaL
liO Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt, 27
HARV. L. REv. 107, 120 (1913).
60 Id. at 120-21.
61 Id. at 115-16. See also GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 71, at 179-83 (3d ed. 1949).
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The courts have not followed Professor Beale's theory. Instead,
they have continued to hold that the situs of a debt for the purposes of garnishment is with the debtor, and that personal service
upon the debtor is an attachment of the debt. 62 Situs of the property within the territorial limits of the state is as essential to the
validity of the in rem proceeding of escheat as it is to the quasi
in rem proceedings of garnishment, and the same jurisdictional
theory underlying Harris v. Balk furnishes the basis for jurisdiction
in escheat today. 63 If, as Professor Beale contended, coercive power
is the true foundation of jurisdiction, his conclusions follow. It is
therefore necessary to analyze the two theories to determine where
they differ and why.
The essential weakness in Professor Beale's theory is that it assumes an essential connection between the standards of in rem
jurisdiction and those of in personam jurisdiction. As stated by
Professor Carpenter,64 his conclusion "is based upon the assump•
tion that the debt cannot have a situs with debtor." 65 In short, his
major premise is that without physical existence there can be no
existence for jurisdictional purposes. But there is no reason why
the courts cannot treat the debt differently for the purposes of
in rem proceedings than they do for the purpose of in personam
proceedings. Nothing requires the court to deal with the in personam rights and duties between the parties themselves in an in
rem action. In the case of tangible property attachments, only
the in rem rights of the parties are affected; no one has ever
thought in personam jurisdiction over both the parties was necessary.66 This is explained by Professor Carpenter in the following
manner:
"In the case of a debt, the relationship between the creditor and the debtor has two aspects of significance for the law;
one, the direct relationship between the creditor and the
debtor, i.e., the right in personam which the creditor has
against the debtor, and the correlative duty of the debtor to
the creditor, and the other, its relationship to third persons,
i.e., to the world. In this latter aspect, the law has come to
62 See STOMBERG, CoNFUcr OF LAws 107-09 (2d ed. 1951).
63 The distinction between quasi in rem and in rem judgments is merely in the
range of persons affected. The jurisdictional theory of escheat will be fully developed infra.
64 Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment,
and Taxation, 31 HARV. L. REv. 905 (1918). This article was written in reply to Professor
Beale's article, supra note 59.
65 Id. at 911. (Emphasis added.)
66 See Carpenter, supra note 64, at 912-13.
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treat this right of the creditor as it relates to third persons as a
property right. The debt is an asset of the creditor, in the same
way in which any tangible property he owns is an asset." 67
Simply stated, this is but to say that a court can treat a debt as
property if it ·wishes, and no violence ·will be done to the traditional
power theory of jurisdiction since the judgment affects only the
in rem rights of the creditor in the intangible and not the in personam rights he has against the debtor. Putting the matter crudely,
but perhaps most accurately, since the state could imprison the
debtor to prevent payment to the creditor, it exercises and possesses as much control over the debt as it does over a chattel seizure
or levy.08
This is not a complete answer to Professor Beale's arguments,
however. It is simply a refusal to accept his syllogism's major
premise that if physical power is accepted as the basis of jurisdiction, then it is impossible to reconcile the use of a fictional object, or, stated another way, that physical power cannot operate
upon an imaginary object. Conceptually, the distinction is illustrated by Professor Chafee's matchless allegory:
"This attempt to divide a debt into two independent parts
recalls the story of the two men who bought a cow, one owning the front portion, and the other the rear, until the front
mvner, wearying of supplying food while the other got all the
milk, decided to kill his half, 'and Bill's half died too, it did.'
Any judicial action upon the debtor's obligation must necessarily affect the creditor's right, and therefore he is a necessary
party to the suit.'' 69
The difference between the views of the courts following the doctrines of Harris v. Balk, on the one hand, and of Professor Beale,
on the other, seems to be as simple as that. The courts simply
will not carry the logic of physical power as far as will Professor
Beale.
With this background of competing jurisdictional concepts it
is possible to trace the development of the present jurisdictional
67 Carpenter, supra note 64, at 912. Cf. HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
68-114 (1923); STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 115-34 (1950).
68 This illustration also shows the weakness of Carpenter's argument. An injunction against the garnishee preventing payment is of course equivalent to imprisonment in
this analogy. But it must be noted that the only thing making control over the debt by
service upon the garnishee equivalent to control over a tangible is the full faith and
credit clause, for otherwise another gamisher could garnish a corporate garnishee in
another state.
69 Chafee, Interstate lnterpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685, 709 (1924).
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theory in the area of escheat of abandoned intangible property.
In Security Sav. Bank v. California,70 the Supreme Court was
forced to consider the jurisdictional theory of escheat for the first
time. 71 In this case, deposits72 in a California bank were sought
to be escheated to the state pursuant to a California "abandoned
property" statute. 73 The Court held that since the debts arose out
of contracts made and to be performed in California they were
property within the state and service of process upon the bank was
a seizure of that debt. The only authority cited for the proposition that the debts were property within the state was Professor
Carpenter's article.74 This article, as before noted, 75 was ·written as
a rebuttal of Professor Beale's objections to Harris v. Balk and as
a justification and explanation of the jurisdictional theories it embodied. In the next Supreme Court escheat case, Anderson Nat'l
Bank v. Luckett,1 6 unclaimed bank deposits were again held to be
properly subject to escheat.77 The Supreme Court was again faced
with the problem of jurisdictional theory in Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Moore.78 There, the state of New York sought to escheat
the proceeds of unclaimed insurance policies issued in New York on
the lives of New York residents, payable to New York beneficiaries.79 The difficulty arose because the insurance companies
were not incorporated in New York, but were merely doing business in that state. Using language which has apparently caused some
10 263

U.S. 282 (1923).
Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911), was the first case
before the Supreme Court involving escheat of intangible property. However, the jurisdictional issue was not presented in the opinion. Only the power of the state to escheat
appeared to be in issue. In Security S(W. Bank the Court was squarely faced with the
issue of jurisdiction.
72 It does not appear from the record whether any of the depositors were nonresidents.
Consequently, while the point was argued the Court made no specific holding concerning
residence. Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 284, 290 (1923).
73 This proceeding was under a custodial-type statute, later repealed upon adoption
of the Uniform Act in 1959.
74 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 285 n.3 (1923).
75 Note 64 supra.
76 321 U.S. 233 (1944). Although United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276 (1938), was
decided before Anderson Nat'l Bank and involved escheat, its holding was limited to the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's escheat of funds in possession of federal court, and did
not directly involve the jurisdictional issues relevant to the problem of multiple escheat.
77 The proceeding here was under the Kentucky escheat-type statute, but suit was
brought before the determination of abandonment and therefore that the state was
acting in capacity of conservator. The Court refused to distinguish the California statute
from the Kentucky statute, with the result that the opinion is essentially a reaffirmation
of Security Sav. Bank. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, supra note 76, at 242. It did not
appear whether any of the depositors were nonresidents.
78 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
79 Id. at 550.
71
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confusion, the Court said, "The question is whether the State of
New York has sufficient contacts with the transactions here in
question to justify the exertion of the power to seize abandoned
moneys due to its residents."80 This is nothing more than an application of the test of International Shoe Co. v. W ashington81
for determining whether personal service of process may be made
on a foreign corporation doing business within the state.82 However, the holding was precisely limited to the case where the policies were issued for delivery in New York, on the lives of New
York residents, and payable to New York beneficiaries, with the
caveat that the insured continue his residence and that the beneficiary be a resident at the maturity of the policy.88 The most recent
Supreme Court case developing the jurisdictional theory of escheat
is Standard Oil Co. v. New ]ersey.84 But prior to an examination
of this case it is desirable to summarize the developments which
preceded it, in order that its effects may be more fully appreciated.
Security Sav. Bank and Anderson Nat'l Bank both held that
the state of incorporation might escheat unclaimed bank deposits.
Connecticut Mutual held that a state other than that of incorporation might also escheat insurance proceeds if that state had sufficient "contacts" with the transaction to meet the test of International Shoe. Connecticut Mutual was strictly limited to the case
where both the insured and the beneficiary were residents of the
state seeking to escheat. Although it was argued in Security Sav.
Bank that nonresident depositors would not be bound by the
escheat, 85 the record does not show that any were, in fact, 86 nonresidents, and the court did not consider their rights.87 Since this
so Id. at 548.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
82 See generally, GOODRICH, CoNFL1cr OF LAws § 76 (3d ed. 1949).
83 This was the posture in which the case was presented by the lower court, 187 Misc.
1004, 65 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd mem., 271 App. Div 1002, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 323,
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E.2d 24: (1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). It should be noted that
the reason the courts of New York so limited their decision was to alleviate the possibility
of multiple escheat. However, the United States Supreme Court added the caveat that the
residence of the parties continue to be in New York.
84 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
85 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 286 (1923).
86 263 U.S. at 284, 290. See note 72 supra.
87 Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 290 (1923). The difficulty with this
interpretation is that the Court summarizes the bank's argument as to nonresident de•
positors, 263 U.S. at 286, and then proceeds in its opinion as if it had answered these
arguments by saying the proceeding is quasi in rem as to depositors. Since the state court
reserved the question of the rights of depositors the most reasonable interpretation seems
to be that the Supreme Court did not consider their status.
81

768

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

was apparently true in Anderson Bank as well,88 it might be forcefully argued that the only state with jurisdiction to escheat intangible property is that of the last known domicile of the mrner
of that intangible, provided personal service can be had upon the
holder. This argument is considerably strengthened by the reference to "discharge"89 of the obligation by payment to the state
pursuant to the escheat statute. Since the debt could be discharged
only in the sense of termination of liability to the mrner if the
court had in personam jurisdiction over both the parties, and
since the above interpretation does provide this jurisdiction, it may
be argued that this was the jurisdictional theory of Connecticut
Mutual.
In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,90 the majority of the
Supreme Court held that New Jersey, the state of incorporation of
the holder, could escheat the unclaimed stock and dividends of
shareholders whose last kno,rn addresses were outside of New
Jersey. 91 The corporation had no property in New Jersey except
its stock and transfer books.92 Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Reed held that:
"It was not solely the fact that the contracts for bank deposits were made in California and Kentucky that gave those
states power over the abandoned deposits. . . . The controlling
fact was that the banks and the depositors could be served with
process, either personally or by publication, to determine
rights in this chose in action."93
This decision rests squarely on the jurisdictional theory embodied
in Harris v. Balk. No question of "contacts" is raised, for it has
always been held that the state of incorporation has in personam
jurisdiction over its domestic corporations.94 The last knmrn residence of the owner of the intangible property is immaterial under
this decision. The sole issue is whether the corporate holder may
be personally served with process - the same test as that employed
in Harris v. Balk.
Regardless of the argument that a different theory was used
prior to the decision in Standard Oil, these decisions can all be
supra.

88 See note 77
89 Security Sav.

Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 286 (1923). See also Anderson Nat'l
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 242 (1944).
00 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
91 See id. at 437 n.8 as to residence of owners.
92 Id. at 437.
93 Id. at 437-38.
94 GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 75 (3d ed. 1949).
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easily and simply reconciled. Since it is now apparent that the
only issue is whether personal service of process upon the holder
can be made, and the only time this argument could be raised is
in a case like Connecticut JJ.!utual where the holder is incorporated
in another state, the absence of discussion on this point is understandable. Only in a state other than that of incorporation is the
issue of "contacts" with the transaction giving rise to the intangible
relevant. 95 Further, in all the cases prior to Standard Oil, "discharge" of the obligation between mvner and holder was possible
since the court had in personam jurisdiction over both the parties96
- service upon the absent resident owner by publication and personal service upon the holder. "Discharge" of the obligation, however, is not possible in a case like Standard Oil because the court
cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident owner
by constructive service. It is this distinction between the Standard
0 il case and those prior to it which has raised the serious problem
of multiple escheat of intangibles.97
Unfortunately, the majority of the Court in Standard Oil confused the distinction between the jurisdictional theory of Harris
v. Balk and that of Professor Beale. This is illustrated by their
statement, "Whatever may be Professor Beale's view of garnishment, he agrees ·with the theory of control relied upon herein."98
It is more likely, however, that Professor Beale would dissent
from any decision allowing in rem proceedings against intangible
property without first gaining in personam jurisdiction over both
the parties to the obligation. The majority then goes on to say
that the "rights of the owners of the stock and dividends come
within the reach of the court by notice, i.e., service by publication ...." 00 In view of the decision of this same Court in Estin v.
Estin,1° 0 just three years earlier, it seems clear that they do not
mean to say that service by publication upon a nonresident can
05 This assumes that the test of International Shoe does not apply to service of process
upon individuals, and the transitory presence within the state is sufficient to found in
personam jurisdiction over individuals as distinguished from corporations. But cf. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws pt. 1, § 30 (1959).
06 But cf. Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
07 Cf. McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer, 14
Bus. LAw. 1062, 1068-71 (1959); Colby, The 1954 Uniform and Model Acts: A Summary
and Analysis, 41 A.B.A.J. 39 (1955); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 136-37 (1954).
OB Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 438 n.9 (1951).
oo Id. at 440.
100 334 U.S. 541 (1948). "But we are aware of no power which the State of domicile
of the debtor has to determine the personal rights of the creditor in the intangible unless
the creditor has been personally served or appears in the proceeding. The existence of
any such power has been repeatedly denied." ld. at 548..
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furnish the basis for an in personam judgment against him.101
The most reasonable interpretation of this opinion would appear
to be that, for the purposes of an in rem or quasi in rem judgment,
"substantive" due process is satisfied by personal service of process
upon the holder of abandoned intangibles, and that "procedural"
due process is satisfied by service by publication on the nonresident owner. The majority appears to have misunderstood Professor Beale's theory of power as the basis of jurisdiction. Properly
viewed, the escheat cases merely represent an application of Harris
v. Balk) involving reification of a "right" as a "thing."
But the distinctions between Professor Beale's theory and the
present judicial theory of jurisdiction are important, for they bear
directly upon the effectiveness of full faith and credit as a bar to
multiple escheat and to current attempts to solve the problem of
multiple escheat of intangible property.

III.

FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT AS A BAR To MuLTIPLE EscHEAT

In Standard Oil) the majority of the Supreme Court stated
that the full faith and credit clause would be a bar to multiple
escheat.102 As a theoretical matter, they are clearly correct. Although there may be potentially more than one situs for an intangible because more than one state may have sufficient contacts to justify personal service upon a corporate holder,103 once
process has issued against the holder there has been a seizure of
the property, and, after entry of judgment,104 a conclusive determination of situs. Since seizure of property with a situs within the
territorial boundaries of the state is essential to jurisdiction,105
the second state cannot thereafter seize the same intangible with101But cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); EHRENZWEIG,
CoNFLicr OF LAws pt. I,§ 28 (1959); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer,
30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 285 (1958).
102 341 u .s. at 443.
103 "There are several states with possible claims to the escheat of intangibles. The
state of incorporation of the obligor; the state where the last known owner was domiciled ... the state where later on the true residence of the owner was proved to be; the
state of his last known domicile; the state where the obligor has its main place of business;
in case of insurance or trust property, the state of residence (or domicile) of the beneficiary." Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 445 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
104 It is difficult to determine whether the seizure, i.e., service of process upon the
holder, or the entry of judgment is the critical fact. The issue will arise when a second
state begins an escheat proceeding while such a proceeding is pending in another state
and the second state renders judgment first. For an analogous situation in garnishment,
see Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); 2 SHINN, ATIACHMENT AND
GARNISHMENT § 721 (1896).
105 REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 5, 32, comment b (1942).
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out denying the full faith and credit to the prior judgment.106
Because of this, the first state to adjudicate the issue of situs is
the only state with jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat. The
result is a race of diligence among the competing states.107
A difficulty, however, arises, for unless the first state had jurisdiction, its adjudication of the situs issue is not entitled to full
faith and credit. Under present theories of escheat, the holder
is viewed as a mere stakeholder108 in an in rem proceeding to determine title to property in his possession. The effect is to magnify
jurisdictional defects, for they can neither be waived nor cured,1° 9
and full faith and credit does not preclude collateral attack upon
the first judgment for any minute jurisdictional error.11° In the
event such error is found, the second state may escheat the same
intangible and the holder is left to whatever remedies he may have
against the first state. Fortunately, no case of multiple escheat has
yet been reported,1 11 but if the unfortunate experience of garnishees under this same theory112 is any indication of what may
be expected, it is only a question of time before such a case will
be before the Supreme Court.113
100 For the purposes of this comment it will be assumed that full faith and credit is
required for administrative determinations as well as strictly judicial determinations. See
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944).
107 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 444 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
108 Cf. Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Security Sav.
Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 285 (1923); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S.
233, 242 (1944); see also Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685, 711 (1924); 2
SHINN, op. cit. supra note 104, § 471, at 838.
100 Cf. Note, "Double Liability" of Garnishees Resulting From Failure of Jurisdiction,
48 YALE L.J. 690 (1939).
110 For illustrations of errors attacked in garnishment cases, see Notes, 29 MICH. L. REv.
114 (1930) and 40 YALE L.J. 139 (1930). See generally RooD, GARNISHMENT §§ 202-20
(1896); 2 SHINN, op. cit. supra note 104, §§ 707-27. See also Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term, 1939, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 1006 (1940); Farrier,
Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts, 2 U. CHI L. REv. 552 (1935);
Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 VA. L. REv. 557
(1943); Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdictional
Issues, 36 GEo. L.J. 154 (1948); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1949).
111 The closest approach has been Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73
Dauph. 160, 173 (Pa. C.P. 1958), where the court said, "It is set forth that $725.85 has
already been escheated to New York and payment of that amount has been made. We
take this opportunity of saying that we do not recognize New· York's authority to escheat
that money, but since it has been done we have no jurisdiction over this sum."
112 See authorities cited in note 110 supra.
113 The case is most likely to arise when the first state to escheat is the domicile of
the owner and the second state is tbe state of incorporation of the holder. Cf. State v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956).
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The reasons for the danger of multiple escheat are found in
the doctrines of collateral attack114 of judgments and in the fact
that in personam jurisdiction over both the owner and the holder
are not required by the present theory. Congressional implementation of the full faith and credit clause requires that judicial
proceedings shall have the same effect in other states "as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken. " 115 This means not only that the
judgment must be enforced, but also that the doctrines of collateral
attack and res judicata relating to the effect of that judgment
must also be given full faith and credit.11 6 In analyzing the effect
of a judgment it is necessary to distinguish between collateral attack and res judicata doctrines. Res judicata117 relates to the
effect of a judgment between parties and those in privity with
them. Collateral attack doctrines118 relate to the issue whether
a judgment may be incidentally attacked in a second action for
want of jurisdiction by anyone, whether or not he is a party or
privy. To the extent that doctrines of res judicata prevent relitigation of the jurisdictional issue it may be considered as included
within the broader category of doctrines of collateral attack.11°
The general rule is that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction
over the parties in an in personam proceeding or without jurisdiction over the res in an in rem proceeding is wholly void120
and subject to collateral attack at any time.121 But this rule is
sharply limited where parties and those in privity with them attempt to attack the judgment. Here, res judicata is held to preclude
collateral attack by this class of persons where the issue of jurisdiction was actually litigated,122 or could have been litigated,123
in the first action. Since these persons have had their day in court,
114 See generally 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 304-400 (5th
JUDGMENTS §§ 11-13 (1942).
115 28
§ 1738 (1958).
116 See Rashid, supra note 110.
117 See generally R.EsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 41-76 (1942).
118 See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 305 (5th ed. 1925).
119 There is a great deal of unnecessary confusion in the

ed. 1925);

R.EsrATEMENT,

u.s.c.

terminology in this area.
Some authors prefer to use the term "res judicata" to refer only to the effects of a valid
judgment. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 304 (5th ed. 1925). The Restatement usage seems
preferable, and it will be used in this comment.
120 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 325 (5th ed. 1925).
121 R.EsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 11 (1942). See R.EsrATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws
§§ 429-51 (1934).
122 R.EsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 9, 10 (1942); R.EsrATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 451
(1934).
123 See Boskey & Braucher, supra note 110. Cf. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
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the salutary policy of putting an end to litigation overrides the
possibility of injustice resulting from a lack of jurisdiction.124
This limitation is not imposed upon strangers125 to the first action,
however, and, if they have an interest or right adversely affected
by the judgment,1 26 they may attack it for any jurisdictional defect.
With this general examination of the doctrines of collateral
attack it is now possible to consider their application and effect
upon the two theories.
A.

Effect Under Present Jurisdictional Theory

At least two distinct factual situations have arisen under the
present jurisdictional theory of escheat. The first situation is
illustrated by the Standard Oil case, where the proceeding was instituted in the holder's state of incorporation but the owner was
a nonresident. The second situation is illustrated by the Connecticut Mutual case, where the proceeding was instituted in the
state of the mrner's last kno,rn domicile and the holder was a
foreign corporation which was personally served with process. The
theoretical distinction between the two situations arises from the
fact that the requirements of both in rem and in personam jurisdiction are satisfied in the Connecticut Mutual situation and only
the in rem requirements are met in the Standard Oil situation.
Where in personam jurisdiction over the owner is not acquired,
as in Standard Oil, the judgment can operate only in rem. Consequently, the mrner's in personam rights against the holder are
not affected, and since the mrner was not a party or privy to the
first proceeding, he may collaterally attack it for jurisdictional
defects. However, with respect to the o,rner's in personam rights
against the holder on the original obligation there are two important limitations. First, a statute of limitations may have run
against the mrner as to this obligation. Second, as in the case of
garnishment,127 the holder may plead his payment to the state as a
defense. But, if this payment was not made pursuant to a valid
court order, that is, if the court did not have jurisdiction to issue
such an order, then this payment is not a defense in the action by
the mrner.128 In view of the efficacy of the statute of limitations
against the o"t\Tller, whether it be construed to extinguish either the
1241 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
125 Id. §§ 317-18.

§ 305 (5th ed. 1925).

126Id. § 319.
127 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S.
128 Roon, GARNISHMENT §§

215 (1905).
213, 271 (1896).
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"right" or the "remedy,"129 and the unlikelihood of the owner ever
appearing, it would seem that the possibility of the holder's
liability to the owner after escheat is very small.
Unfortunately, these same considerations do not apply when a
second state attempts to escheat the same intangible property.
Because it is neither party nor privy to the first proceeding, it may
collaterally attack the first judgment for any jurisdictional defect.
It is clearly not bound by a statute of limitation in the first state
which is characterized as extinguishing the remedy of the mmer.130
A difficult and unanswered question remains if this limitation
extinguishes the right.131 This question is intimately related to the
issues presented when in personam jurisdiction is obtained over
the owner in the first proceeding, and will be discussed in that
context.132 With this reservation, it seems clear that if the second
state can find a jurisdictional defect in the first proceeding it
may require the holder to pay again. The holder will be left to
whatever remedies he may have in the first state, and in this he may
be considerably hampered by the fact that doctrines of res judicata133
apply between himself and the first state. If the jurisdictional
defects were caused by the holder's mm inadvertence he may have
no remedy at all.
This unfortunate state of affairs must be compared to a situation where, as in Connecticut Mutual, the court does have jurisdiction for an in personam judgment against the mmer as well as
the holder.134 In this factual situation the escheat proceeding is
akin to a default judgment against the owner,135 but with the important distinction that the default occurs in an in personam proceeding. An important conceptual difference arises from the fact
that the court has jurisdiction over both the parties; the original
debt or other obligation between the owner and the holder is ex129 This distinction corresponds to that of the REsTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAWS
603 (statute of limitations of forum), and § 605 (time limitations on cause of action)
(1934).
130 See RllsTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 603 (1934).
131 See Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAW. 791, 795-97 (1960).
132 See text accompanying notes 134-42 infra.
133 Since the holder was a party to the first proceeding and could have directly
attacked the judgment it is difficult to see how he could avoid the res judicata effect of
his appearance. Unless the holder could obtain equitable relief for mistake, 1 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 308 (5th ed. 1925), it would appear he must rely upon provisions for reimbursement in the escheat statute of the first state.
134 See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
135 This is by hypothesis true in all escheat proceedings. For a discussion of the
effect on collateral attack doctrines generally, see 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 662 (5th ed.
1925).
§
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tinguished.138 This must be carefully distinguished from the case
previously discussed where the court does not have in personam
jurisdiction over both parties. Because a debt subsists only as a
legal relation between the parties,137 it has no existence for any
purpose without the existence of such a relationship. So long
as this relation exists, it is possible to argue that the debt has a
-situs in one state rather than in another. The only issue is in which
state is the legal situs for the purposes of escheat. But this neces-sarily assumes the existence of the debt or some other obligation.
If the intangible does not exist, if it has been destroyed by extinguishing the obligation, no state can escheat. Thus in the state
-court opinion138 in the Standard Oil case, the New Jersey court held
that since the New Jersey statute of limitations extinguished the
rights and not merely the remedies of some of the owners of the
-claims sought to be escheated, even the state of New Jersey was
barred with regard to these, for the obligation or res no longer
existed to be escheated.139 Similarly, in State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,140 escheat of unclaimed "Green Stamps" was denied on
-grounds that the state had "proved no rights to which it may succeed."141 The court held that the accumulation by one person
-0f 1200 stamps in a book was the condition upon which the obligation to pay arose, and since the state had not shmvn that this condition was met there was no showing that there ever had been an
obligation.142 It would also seem clear that the holder may prove
payment or other discharge of an obligation and avoid payment in
that manner. Each of these illustrations points to the importance
of in personam jurisdiction in destroying the intangible property
itself. If the holder is faced with a second escheat proceeding after
such an in personam discharge, the second state should be required
to first show that the obligation still exists before the question
-0£ situs is even reached. Inquiry must therefore be directed toward
the issue of whether the in personam rights of the owner against
the holder have been terminated by the first proceeding. U nfortunately for the holder, it would appear that application of the doc136 This is to be distinguished from the ambiguous term "discharge" so often used
by the courts in both garnishment and escheat cases to mean merely that the courts will
not compel a man to pay his debts twice. See note 58 supra.
137 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948); see also Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction
In Rem To Compel Payment of a Debt, Z7 HARV. L. REv. 107, 115-16 (1913).
138 State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950).
130 Id. at 292-98, 74 A.2d at 570-73.
140 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
141 Id. at 596, 603-04, 153 A.2d at 695, 698-99.
142 See Ely, supra note 131, at 803-05.
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trines of collateral attack to an in personam judgment allows no
greater protection against multiple escheat than if the judgment
was merely in rem.
Only where the first state is the domicile of the owner can
constructive service be sufficient to support an in personam judgment affecting the owner's rights.143 It seems clear, then, that if
the second state can prove that the mrner's domicile was not in
the first state, the judgment of escheat can operate only in rem.
The second state should also be free to attack the in personam
proceedings for any other jurisdictional defect which infects the
validity of the in personam judgment. Improper service upon
the holder144 or failure to comply with the constructive service
statute145 will prevent the court from acquiring in personam jurisdiction and extinguishing the obligation. Once such a defect is
found, a second state might be able to compel payment from the
holder a second time. Defects in the acquisition of in personam
jurisdiction should be no more difficult to find than defects in in rem
jurisdiction, and it is therefore likely that the danger of multiple
escheat is essentially the same, whether the facts are similar to those
of Connecticut Mutual or to those of Standard Oil. Thus under
present jurisdictional theories of escheat, the theoretical distinction between in personam jurisdiction over both the parties and in
rem jurisdiction over the intangible has no significant practical
effect in preventing multiple escheat.

B. Effect Under Professor Beale's Theory of Jurisdiction
The essential difference between Professor Beale's theory of
jurisdiction over intangibles and the present theories lies in the fact
that Professor Beale would require in personam jurisdiction over
both the parties. While in personam jurisdiction over the parties
may result under present jurisdictional theories, as in Connecticut
Mutual, it is not essential. Since escheat can occur only when the
owner does not appear, the only state ·with jurisdiction to escheat
under Professor Beale's theory is the state of the mrner's domicile.
The result is that the only way the second state may attack the first
143 REsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 16, comments a, b (1942).
144 Cf. 2 SHINN, A'ITACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT §§ 471, 472,
NISHMENT §

680 (1896); ROOD,

GAR•

271 (1896).

145 For types of jurisdictional defects which make judgment void and subject to collateral attack, see RooD, GARNISHMENT§§ 202-20 (1896); 2 SHINN, op. cit. supra note 144, at
§§ 707-27; REsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 8, comment b (1942). But cf. Moore &: Oglebay,
supra note 110, at 572.
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proceedings is by showing that it is the domicile of the owner. The
almost overwhelming practical difficulties of proving domicile in
the setting of escheat, where the owners have not been heard from
for many years, would seem to make proof of domicile by the second state improbable. Since the attacking party, and not the holder,
has the burden of proof,1 46 it would seem that as a practical matter
the danger of multiple escheat is strikingly limited under Professor
Beale's theory of jurisdiction. Collateral attack is permitted only
where the attacking party has an interest adversely affected by the
prior judgment, and under Professor Beale's theory, only the state
of owner's domicile could have such an interest.147 In view of the
great difference in the dangers of multiple escheat which flow from
a theory such as that of Standard Oil and Connecticut Mutual on
the one hand, and that of Professor Beale, on the other, it is important to see what reasons may have impelled the choice. Although any inquiry into the practical reasoning of the Court is
bound to be speculative, Mr. Justice Cardozo's advice that situs
is the result of a "common sense appraisal of the requirements of
justice and convenience in particular conditions"148 bids us at least
inquire.
First, there is a distinct possibility that no state may be able to
escheat under Professor Beale's strict power theory of jurisdiction.
In some cases there will be no way of determining domicile at all,
since the owner may have no known address.149 While the courts
may have to make the best of what they have, mere knowledge of
the owner's address many years ago may seem unsatisfactory for the
purposes of establishing in personam jurisdiction.150 In any case,
the only basis for the determination of domicile will be a presumption that one established years ago continues until evidence
of a new domicile is presented.151 Even if domicile is adequately
established, the state may not be able to get in personam juris146 Cf. State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286,
JUDGMENTS §§ 373-92 (5th ed. 1925).
H7 See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 319 (5th ed. 1925).

119 A.2d 767 (1956); 1

FREEMAN,

This is so because under Beale's
theory only the state of owner's domicile can obtain jurisdiction and unless the second
state has jurisdiction to escheat it has been deprived of nothing by the prior judgment.
HS Sevemoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 174
N.E. 299, 300 (1931).
HO In this case the court would either have to assume a domicile or not allow escheat.
150 Cf. State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 295, 119 A.2d 767, 772 (1956).
And see 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 385 (5th ed. 1925), c.onceming presumptions on constructive service when subjected to collateral attack.
151 "A domicil once established c.ontinues until it is superseded by a new domicil."
RFsrATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 23 (1934).
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diction over the holder.152 Or the domiciliary state may not have
an escheat statute; 153 or even if the state has an escheat statute and
can personally serve the parties, the holder may have no assets within the state. The difficulty of enforcing payment from assets held
in other states154 may create serious doubt concerning the efficacy
of such escheat. Since the general attitude toward escheat is one of
preventing a windfall to the holder and of applying abandoned
property to the benefit of all rather than the chance enrichment of
the "lucky" holder, the importance of these considerations cannot
be overemphasized.155
Second, if the relative merits of the claims of competing states
are considered,156 it is possible to conclude that the state of last
known residence or domicile of the O"Wner has the least meritorious
claim.157 The greater part of the corporate business that produced
the wealth embodied in the intangible may have been carried on
in, and under the protection laws of the laws of, another state. In
its effect, escheat of abandoned property has the same revenue-producing capability as taxation.158 With this prima facie resemblance, an analogy from taxation to escheat is not difficult to
draw.159 Jurisdiction for the purposes of taxation is based upon a
rationale of "benefits conferred."160 Perhaps this colored the
Court's thinking.
152 While this possibility is decreased if the holder is an interstate corporation, the
vague standards of International Shoe and Connecticut Mutual would appear to limit
severely the number of states in which the holder could be served.
153 At present only 18 states have statutes escheating intangibles. See states listed in
note 6 supra.
154 If the escheat proceeding is held to result in a judgment for the payment of money
to the state no difficulty should be encountered. See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). But if the escheat proceeding results in an order to turn over
the intangible to the state, it seems somewhat anomalous to need to enforce that judgment
in another state since the first state ostensibly decided that the "situs" of the intangible
was within its territory.
155 "Such property thus escapes seizure by would-be possessors and is used for the
general good rather than for the chance enrichment of particular individuals or organizations." Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951); NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 137 (1954).
156 See Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 1413-19 (1952), for evaluation of claims.
157 State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956).
158 See McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer,
14 Bus. LAw. 1062, 1065-68 (1959), for a recent analysis of the revenue-producing capability of escheat. While the quantity is small compared to taxation, it is significant. For
example, New Jersey grossed approximately $1,175,000 from her escheat statutes in 1957,
at a collection cost of only $14,000. Id. at 1067.
159 It is relevant to note the number of times tax cases are cited in escheat proceedings.
Eight tax cases are cited in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 439-40 (1951).
160 "Power growing out of some benefit or protection conferred by the taxing state
is now the constitutional standard of jurisdiction to tax." GooDRICH, CoNFLicr OF LAws
§ 44, at 101 (3d ed. 1949).
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But whatever its reasoning, the Court in Standard Oil elected
to extend Harris v. Balk rather than to adopt Professor Beale's
rationale. The result is that all the shortcomings which flow from
the doctrines of collateral attack have been preserved to plague
the holder and his attorney.
IV.

THE UNIFORM

AcT SOLUTION

One of the most comprehensive and complete solutions to the
problem of multiple escheat is the suggested solution of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.161 This act is of
great significance for two reasons: first, because it was specifically
drawn for the purpose of meeting the problem posed by multiple
escheat of abandoned intangible property;162 and, second, because
it is essentially a repudiation of the present jurisdictional theories
of escheat and an adoption of the power theory of Professor Beale.
As the considered opinion of disinterested men whose product has
met the acid test of approval in many state legislatures, its solution
must be treated with deference. Acceptance of the act by seven
states,163 and serious consideration by four more,16 4 within six
years of its submission, despite its being more restrictive than
present theories,1 65 amply demonstrates the wisdom of its framers
and the seriousness of the problem of multiple escheat.
In interpreting the act it is essential to bear in mind that it has
two purposes: the prevention of multiple escheat and prevention
of windfalls to holders. Since the possibility of multiple escheat
arises only ·with abandoned intangible property, the act's scope is
so limited. While present jurisdictional theories effectively prevent windfalls, they give rise to the danger of multiple escheat.
Professor Beale's theory prevents multiple escheat but it may allow
windfalls, since escheat may not always be possible. What the
framers of the act have done is to adopt Professor Beale's strict
power theory of jurisdiction and to modify it to accommodate
an important aim of escheat-the prevention of windfalls to holders.
On its face, the act gives little indication of the jurisdictional
theory it embodies. The key to the act is contained in a section
providing for reciprocity:
161 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK
136-53 (1954).
102 Id. at lll6-37.
163 Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, Washington.
164 Florida, Mississippi, Wisconsin, Texas.
165 The Uniform Act is more restrictive because, among the enacting states, the state
of the owner's last known residence will usually be the only state able to escheat.
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"If specific property which is subject to the provisions of
sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 is held for or owed or distributable to
an owner whose last known address is in another state by a
holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of that state, the
specific property is not presumed abandoned in this state and
subject to this act...." 166
All intangible property except that held by life insurance companies,167 utilities,168 and state courts, public officers, and agencies169 is covered by the provisions of this section. If every state
adopts the act, this reciprocal provision will allow escheat only
by the state of the mmer's last known residence, but only if that
state has jurisdiction over the holder. This last limitation is dictated by the overriding aim of escheat in preventing windfalls, for
if the owner's state of residence cannot obtain personal service
upon the holder, the state which can obtain such service 1\Till be
allowed to escheat under the dual jurisdictional standards of sections 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9.170 The effect of the Uniform Act is thus
to limit jurisdiction to the state which can get in personam jurisdiction over both the parties, whenever this is possible. This 1\Till
be possible in many of the cases which raise the danger of multiple
escheat because the danger arises primarily where interstate corporations are holders.171 That this was the rationale of the framers
of the act is borne out by the special treatment given to insurance
companies in section 3, and the explanatory comment which limits
jurisdiction for escheat to the last knmm residence1 72 of the person
entitled to the funds:
"In general, insurance companies qualify and are authorized to write insurance in many or most of the states of the
Union. Therefore, jurisdiction over such companies as holders of unclaimed property is normally wide-spread throughout the country...." 173
166 UNIFORM DISPosmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 10.
167 UNIFORM DISPOSmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 3.
168 UNIFORM DISPOsmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 4.
169 UNIFORM D1sposmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 8.
170 E.g., § 2 provides: "The following property held or owing by a

banking or financial
organization is presumed abandoned •••"; § 1 defines such organization to be those "engaged in business in this state."
111 The danger is proportional to the number of states in which the corporation is
doing business. The danger will be reduced if the Supreme Court allows escheat proceedings in only two states, that of incorporation and that of the owner's last known residence.
172 The term "last known residence" is probably used in the Uniform Act to obviate
difficult questions of proof which might be thought to arise if the term "domicile" were
used instead. But cf. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LA.ws,
HANDBOOK 145 (comment following§ 10) (1954), which suggests that the framers may have
intended "residence" to be synonymous with "domicile."
173 Id. at 141-42 (comment following § 3).
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Thus, in the case where the possibility of multiple escheat is the
greatest, the possibility of a windfall is the least, and the framers
stick strictly to Professor Beale's theory of jurisdiction.
Escheat of deposits held by utility companies is excepted from
the general rule of jurisdiction by the state of the owner's last
known residence because "recognizing the desirability of avoiding a windfall by the utility, there is nevertheless a certain lack of
equity in the acquisition of funds by a state other than that in
which the services were rendered."174 This rather anomalous
exception and separate treatment was probably prompted as much
by the strength of utility lobbies in the state legislatures as it was
by any inherent "equity."175 The exception of property held by
state courts, public officers, and agencies176 is not explained, but
the intimate connection they have with the state and the improbability of such suit by another state seems a sufficient explanation.
In the preceding section, certain objections to Professor Beale's
theory of jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat were suggested
as possible reasons for the Court's extension of Harris v. Balk to
escheat. The way in which the Uniform Act meets these objections must be noted. First, while preference is given to the state
of the owner's last known residence, if personal service on the
holder cannot be obtained, another state is allowed to escheat. This
prevents the possibility of a windfall to the holder, since some
state will always be able to escheat. Secondly, the acceptance of
the act by the states shows that, in their estimation, their interest
in the property, in the sense of getting their quid for the quo of
benefits conferred on the holder, is outweighed by the possibility
of injustice to the holder by multiple escheat. "\i\Thile the possibility
of multiple escheat is not entirely eliminated, since a second state
may escheat if it can prove that the last known residence of the
owner was there,177 the act appears to present as good a solution
as is possible in our federal system.
Aside from adoption of the Uniform Act, other solutions do not
seem promising. At present it is clear that the holder's state of
incorporation has jurisdiction to escheat, but it is not clear whether
another state other than that of the owner's domicile has this
174 ld. at 142 (comment following § 4).
175 Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 1500-27 which

did not enact the Uniform Act provision for

utilities.
176 UNIFORM DISPosmoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 8.
177 And, of course, the Uniform Act can have no effect upon

not adopting the act.

escheat by those states
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jurisdiction.178 The decision in Connecticut Mutual was specifically limited to the domicile of the person entitled to the
funds. 179 While it is entirely possible that a third state which is
neither the holder's state of incorporation nor the owner's domicile
could be held to have sufficient contacts with the transaction180
to enable escheat, the possibility of injustice to the holder through
multiple escheat is so great that "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice"181 require that escheat jurisdiction be
limited to the state of the O"Wner's domicile and the holder's state
of incorporation. This limitation is consistent with present
decisions and would at least limit the danger to double escheat
rather than multiple escheat.182
Another possible solution is the insertion of a condition of defeasance in the contracts between the holder and the owner which
transfers mmership of the intangible to the holder upon abandonment.183 This solution relates to the termination of the obligation
itself or the condition upon which the obligation arises. This is
suggested by the opinion in State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,1 84
discussed in the preceding section. Its effectiveness depends upon
whether escheat is held to impair the "obligation of contracts,"18G
a question which is, as yet, unanswered.186 In view of the fact that
such conditions would deprive the states of a significant amount of
revenue if held effective, these conditions would at best probably
be strictly construed and perhaps even declared void as contrary
to public policy.187
178But see Schoener v. Continental Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1961)
(Michigan held to have jurisdiction to escheat stock of nonresidents in corporation having
its principal place of business in Michigan but incorporated under the laws of Virginia).
179 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 550 (1948).
180 As to the vagueness of the majority test, see the dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson, id.
at 557-58.
181 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
182 The only escheat case thus far decided by the Supreme Court which did not involve
escheat by the holder's state of incorporation is Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,
333 U.S. 541 (1948). The strict limitation by the majority in that case would seem to
allow argument that escheat jurisdiction must be so limited. But the very vagueness of
the "contacts" test for personal service upon the holder would appear to permit a decision
either way.
183 See Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. I.Aw. 791, 803•04 (1960); Note,
65 HAR.v. L. REv. 1408, 1409-10 (1952).
184 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959).
185 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10.
186 The argument has been repeatedly made and rejected, see e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951). But no express contract between the holder and
the owner has yet been involved.
187 It would appear that a distinction should be drawn, however, between a condition
which prevents an obligation from arising, as in the Sperry b Hutchinson case, and one
which terminates an obligation. A much stronger case is presented for the holder if an
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The use of interstate interpleader under the Federal Interpleader Act188 is often suggested. But even if this act were applicable,180 it is difficult to see how it would have any beneficial results
under present theories. Although the dissenting Justices in the
Standard Oil case have indicated that they wished to weigh the
"interests" of the competing states,19° this is simply not consistent
with the majority's theory of jurisdiction. It is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the first state to serve process upon the holder
is the only state with jurisdiction, and that the interests of the
states could be weighed only if prior decisions were reversed.191
Aside from the adoption of the Uniform Act, one suggested
solution does have considerable merit. It is simply the enactment
of an efficient and certain method for reimbursing the holder in
case of escheat by another state. Very few states make adequate
provision for this eventuality, although under present theories, the
possibility is substantial.192 Such a provision seems essential to our
notions of justice and fair play.193 Even the Uniform Act is not
without fault in this respect, for the vagueness of the criteria194
obligation which never existed is sought to be created by the state for the very purpose of
escheat, than where the holder seeks to enforce a contract provision which, in effect,
forfeits property of the owner. This is particularly relevant where this is done for the
manifest purpose of avoiding escbeat. But there is a large area of uncertainty. E.g., an
increased service charge might be made for unclaimed deposits in banks; this might or
might not be reasonable. But in this area, it should be recognized that the state legisla•
ture will probably have the last word, for the majority in Connecticut Mutual rejected the
bolder•s claim of only contingent liability: "Unless the state is allowed to take possession
of sums in the hands of the companies ••. the insurance companies would retain moneys
contracted to be paid on condition and which normally they would have been required to
pay. We think that the classification of abandoned property established by the statute
describes property that may fairly be said to be abandoned property and subject to the
care and custody of the state and ultimately to escbeat." 333 U.S. at 546.

188 44 Stat. 416 (1926), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958).
180 See generally 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 22.01 ••17 (2d ed. 1948).
100 The majority of the Court in Standard Oil notes that "the details of

the method
of bringing other states and foreign countries before this Court for selection of the appropriate sovereignty to receive the abandoned property are not elaborated upon" by the
dissent. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951).
101 It would seem that the only way the interests of the competing states could be
weighed would be by a method analogous to the now discredited "single tax." Cf. GoonRICH, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 44, at 100-102 (3d ed. 1949).
192 See Ely, Pennsylvania Escheat Laws: Proposals for Revision, 64 DICK. L. R.Ev. 329,
344-45 (1960); Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw. 791, 807 (1960).
103 Such a provision would not be entirely without self interest, for recent decisions
seem to indicate that the state must protect the holder against multiple liability before
escbeat is constitutional. Cf. Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
194 UNI:ORM DISPOSmON OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Acr § 14 provides: "Any holder
who has paid moneys to the [State Treasurer] pursuant to this act may make payment to
any person appearing to such bolder to be entitled thereto, and upon proof of such payment and proof that the payee was entitled thereto, the [State Treasurer] shall forthwith
reimburse the bolder for the payment." (Emphasis added.)
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upon which reimbursement is conditioned could be the cause of
needless and costly litigation.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

Full faith and credit appears to be an inadequate tool with
which to protect a holder of intangible property from the dangers
of multiple escheat. While no incident of multiple escheat has yet
been reported, the increasing recognition and use of escheat as a
source of revenue by the states may be expected to produce such
cases. The obvious injustice of multiple escheat requires a solution, and the most effective answer appears to be that of the
Uniform Act. The Supreme Court could alleviate some of the
hardship and danger to holders by placing a strict interpretation
on Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, and thereby limit
jurisdiction for the purposes of escheat to only two states. Individually, to insure that repayment is prompt and certain, the
states should reconsider their statutory provisions for reimbursement to a holder in the not-unlikely event of multiple escheat.

Clarold L. Britton, S.Ed.

